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Naming the doctrine preached by Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab has never been a simple matter. Early foes classified it as a Kharijite sectarian heresy.
The name that stuck, Wahhabi, stigmatized the doctrine as the ravings of a misguided preacher. Naturally, Ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab and his disciples preferred other names for themselves and.their movement: at first, the folk who profess Cod's unity (ah[ al-tawhid and al-muwahhidun), later, the Najdi call (al-Ja 'wa al-najdiyya).1 Naming, then, is part of arguments over Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's doctrine. If the doctrine is known as Wahhabi, it cannot claim to represent correct belief. The tendency to refer to it as Salafi is a recent development that first emerged among Wahhabism's defenders outside Arabia well before Wahhabis themselves adopted the term.'
To say that a doctrine is Salafi is to ascribe it the authority of Islam's Pious Fathers. The claim has been part of theological discourse since the ninth century. In modern times, the Salafi label has attained a firm grip on the contemporary Sunni Muslim imagination as a marker for Islam in its pristine form. But variation in which beliefs and practices Muslims count as Salafi makes it difficult to define. It helps to distinguish between claiming to follow the way of the Salaf, which is a common trope in Sunni, especially, Hanbali discourse, and claiming to be Salafi as distinct from other Sunnis. In the former case, we have a set of positions on theology and worship. In the latter case, we have a set of claims that would reshape public institutions (through legal reform) and social identity (dressing a certain way). The first is an artifact ' Najd is the region of central Arabia where the movement was born. 2 As awkward as it may be in a chapter about the rhetorical deployment of names, I use the terms Wahhabi and Wahhabism as a matter of convention to refer to Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's teachings and the movement inspired by those teachings.
of classical Islamic thought; the second is an artifact of how Muslims fashion religion as a total way oflife.3
One instance of Salafism in the second sense is the modernist project associated with Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida. They believed it necessary for Muslims to break with their present condition of decadence and return to the glorious past of the Pious Fathers to overcome subjugation to Western powers. The modernist Salafis sought general principles in authoritative texts that permit flexible adaptation to novel forms of governance, law, and education. By contrast, Wahhabis focused on fidelity to what they construed as the creed and cult of the Pious Fathers. For those who regard the modernists as the true Salafis, the Wahhabis' claim to be Salafis is spurious. According to this view, Salafism stood for a modernist outlook until Saudi religious scholars decided to appropriate the Salafi mantle to validate their teachings, reducing Salafism to dogmatism+ Although such a narrative may gratify the urge to discredit Wahhabism, it overlooks three significant points. First, the initial impulse to classify Wahhabis as Salafis came from the modernists themselves. Second, the story of Wahhabism's "Salafi" turn raises questions about terminology that do not go away by deciding which group is truly on the path of the Pious Fathers. Considering the political contexts of shifts in meaning ascribed to Wahhabi and Salaf does help answer such questions. Third, the struggle over naming is part of the broader process of Saudi Arabia's incorporation into the Muslim world. These three points are essential to understanding the phases in Wahhabism's Salafi turn. In the late Ottoman period, modernist Salafis outside Saudi Arabia defended Wahhabis against their critics by referring to them as Sunni adherents of the Hanbali law school. Then, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Wahhabisrn's defenders began to call it Salafi. Finally, in the 1970s, Saudi religious scholars adopted the Salafi mantle. Defenders of such practices incited Ottoman officials againstal-Alusi by accusing him of spreading Wahhabism. On one occasion, al-Alusi was deported from Baghdad on suspicion of supporting the revival of Saudi power in Najd.8
THE WAHHABIS AS SUNNIS
His defense of Wahhabism contained religious and political threads. He rejected the charge that Wahhabis disrespected the Prophet and authoritative ulama, asserting that they were, in fact, muwahhid9 Muslims upholding the beliefs of the Pious Fathers, adhering to Hanbalism, and respecting believers who followed the Sunni law schools.'? Moreover, Al Saud deserved credit for their political achievements, such as ending tribal warfare and bringing security to Arabia. He admitted that they went astray in the early 1800s when they rejected Ottoman authority and interfered with the pilgrimage. Recent Saudi rulers, however, concentrated on their own domain and sent religious teachers to instruct Bedouin in correct religion."
In Damascus, controversy over Wahhabism exhibited similar contours: debate over correct religious practice, ad hominem attacks for holding Wahhabi sympathies, and entanglement with Ottoman sensitivities over loyalty to the sultan. The Damascus setting differed from Baghdad's in one important respect: Young men educated in state schools represented a dynamic element in cultural and political discussions. As youths, they had come under the influence of the modernist Salafis, who blended the call for religious purification with a progressive outlook on education, science, and politics. In addition to attaching new descriptors to Wahhabism, its defenders in Egypt inscribed new meaning in "Salafi" and "Wahhabi" to make them suit the rhetorical purposes of nationalist and state-building discourses. Such rhetorical sculpting is evident in an essay on the history of Wahhabism by Muhammad Hamid al-Figi, the founder of a pro-Wahhabi organization in Egypt. Al-Fiqi's essay is notable for its emphasis on nation building. He praised early Saudi rulers for establishing secure, lawful conditions in Hijaz. He also commended Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab for encouraging the spread ofliteracy so that each believer may understand God's word. Al-Fiqi attributed to Wahhabism the modern aspiration for mass education that would make it possible for each Muslim to have direct contact with scripture rather than relying on the mediated authority of religious experts. That notion became a commonplace in sympathetic writings on Wahhabism, but it was not part of writings by jahiliyya -he drew on nationalist concepts to characterize the old order as one of weakness, misery, and ignorance.19 Al-Qasimi's narrative of the Saudi-Wahhabi enterprise made it a nationalist saga. At a time when Christians were invading Muslim lands, Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab established a model not just of zeal for religion, but of revolution against oppression and for democratic equality. Najdis became attached to Al Saud leadership, which enjoyed divine support in vanquishing Arabian foes to form a single kingdom out of petty principalities. Al-Qasimi called Ibn Saud the genius of the twentieth century, the first Superman, and compared him to Hitler and Mussolini, claiming his accomplishments were greater because they occurred in a backward land immersed in chronic warfare. Thanks to him and to Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia enjoyed complete independence of foreign influence. In nationalist terms, Ibn Saud personified the nation's integrity: He preceded speeches with citations from the Qur'an and the Surma unlike other Muslim leaders who cite Mister so and so, or Monsieur so and so, as though memorizing the Qur'an and citing hadiths were contrary to modern civilization." Nationalist logic is also evident al-Qasimi's defense of the Wahhabi ban on tobacco. He stated that Wahhabism bolsters the believer's will to refrain from temptations like tobacco and drugs that harm body and mind, wealth and freedom. But rather than citing proof-texts from scripture, he argued that smoking is a waste of money, especially in poor developing countries. Workers who earn a few piasters a clay cannot afford to squander them on rolled poison that burns their sick lungs when they have dependents to provide for. Furthermore, when Egyptians and Syrians buy cigarettes, they put money into the pockets of foreign companies at the expense of local enterprises. 21 Besides putting a nationalist spin on Wahhabi Puritanism, he conflated Ibn Saud's efforts to introduce modern technology with the goals of Wahhabism, when, in fact, Ibn Saud had to overcome Wahhabi leaders' objections to technical advances. Al-Qasimi claimed that Wahhabism was open to benefits from industrial techniques and inventions because no religious text contradicts the natural sciences. In fact, that was a modernist Salafi position typical of the "Abduh-Rida school. Al-Qasimi praised the Saudi ruler for the spread of hospitals, doctors, scholars, and schools, and for introducing scientific inventions like the telegraph, telephone, automobile, and aircraft. It is noteworthy that modernist Salafis were not alone in making nationalism and technical progress criteria for judging the merit of Muslim rulers. Conservative ulama in Syria had used the same criteria in arguments for their religious outlook in the late Ottoman period."
The
In three respects, Hijaz was a propitious site for the emergence of Salafism in the late Ottoman period. First, proximity to Yemen exposed religious scholars to Muhammad al-Shawkani's reformist teachings that upheld Salafism's theological positions and sympathy for the Taymiyyan legacy.23 Second, as site of the holy cities, Hijaz attracted ulama from India, including members of the calling it a cause of intellectual and moral decline. He wondered whether defenders of seeking help from the dead ever read scientific publications. His affinity for Wahhabism surfaced when he noted that were it not for the ulama of Najd, graves would be crowded with worshipers. Like the Salafis of Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo, Khuqir asserted that Wahhabis followed the Qur'an and the Surma, the Hanbali law school, and the way of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim.26 Khuqir labored in obscurity during the Ottoman and Hashemite periods, when Mecca's religious establishment evinced little interest in the religious purification trend. In nearby Jidda, modernist Salafism found a foothold among merchants and educated youth. For example, Muhammad Nasif, the scion of a wealthy merchant family, participated in a letter-writing network of Salafi ulama and publicists, and recruited Saudi royalty to patronize publishing activities.27 Another leading voice of educated youth, Muhammad Hasan 'Awwad, expressed modernist Salafi ideas in the 1920s. In an essay condemning conservative ulama, he declared that they were incapable of giving straight answers to simple questions about the benefits of fasting; they had no comprehension of Western scientific thinking and technical advances; and their books on grammar and law were confused and full of contradictions. If Muslims wanted insight into such matters, they should ignore today's ulama and consult the books oflbn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, and al-Shafi'i among the ancients, the works of Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab, and the books of truth about the religion of the Arabs of Najd, some imagined the Najdis to believe in a new madhhab or even a new religion. In fact, the Najdi madhhab adhered to the Qur'an and the Surma, adding nothing and leaving nothing out, preserving the way of the Prophet and the Salaf. In short, the Arabs of Najd followed Islam; there was no other name for it." During the pilgrimage of 1925, Ibn Saud gave a speech to Indian pilgrims, explaining that his folk were loyal to the doctrine and madhhab of the SalafY Umm al-Qura was an official expression of Saudi Arabia's engagement with the outside. It propagated the state's conception of itself and of the religious ideas it championed; its articles included defenses of Wahhabi doctrine as the expression of Sunni Islam. Dynastic favor extended to private initiatives as well. A few months after Ibn Saud's forces took over Jidda, he met with Muhammad Nasif, Muhammad 'Awwad, and others to encourage them to establish an "Islamic Sciences" committee to improve schools. Among its tasks was to compose schoolbooks on theology and law according to the Pious The modernist legacy of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida is notably absent in the Saudi roster of Salafi revivers. In fact, according to a recent narrative, they fall outside the Salafi pale altogether. Instead, they belong to the ranks of Muslim thinkers who came under the spell of European thought, along with Rifaa Rafi' al-Tahtawi, Khair al-Din al-Tunisi, and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. These thinkers assumed that social justice and democratic rights were valid ideas, and they mined the Qur'an and the Surma for texts to support that assumption. By contrast, the method of the true Salafis, like Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab, was to base their views on the Qur'an and the Sunna. The adoption of European ideas infected Muslim political thought.57 To make matters worse, Afghani and 'Abduh joined the Freemasons and disguised their rationalist and modernist convictions in Salafi garb. It was therefore inevitable when Rida fell under 'Abduh's influence that he would pass along his master's misguided views. They all promoted rationalism under the banner of Salafism, and Western writers gullibly credited them with reviving Salafism when in fact they exploited the call for returning to the Pious Fathers as a slogan for their purely political anticolonial agenda. The embrace of the S~lafi mantle was both tactically convenient in the contest against the Muslim Brothers and their offshoots, and substantially easy, given the Wahhabi ularna's conviction that their theology faithfully reproduced the doctrine of the Pious Fathers. They did not ascribe to Salafi the set of modernist, nationalist, and state-building meanings that prevailed earlier. Instead, Salafism was reworked once again to suit circumstances of time and place. In the Saudi context, it was natural that Wahhabi ularna redefined Salafism to legitimate the official creed through the construction of a narrative that emphasized their unique connection to the Pious Fathers' careers and creeds.
Ahl-i Hadith
CONCLUSION
One hundred years ago, Ottoman religious reformers did not want to be called Wahhabis. Najdi Sunnis did not want to be called Wahhabis. One or two early twentieth-century exceptions apart, nobody wanted to be called a Wahhabi.t? The connotations of fanaticism and heresy associated with that name had staying power. By contrast, Salafi became associated with purity and authenticity, giving it a positive connotation in modernist, nationalist, and contemporary religious discourses. But if Salafi can refer to a flexible conception of religion as a set of general principles that allow for adaptation according to time and place, or to a firmly fixed creed that allows for no tampering and regards change with suspicion, is it possible to define the term and classify Muslims who claim it? Without suggesting that Salafi is an infinitely elastic term, we might interpret its permutations as an instance of the ways political context shapes arguments over religious rectitude.
As notions of civilizations' progress and backwardness took root in the Muslim world, religious scholars looked to the Pious Fathers for principles that harmonized with the impulse to adapt to new conditions. Salafi shifted from a term in theological debates to a modernist temperament seeking a foundation for remaking education, law, and politics. In the emergent culture of nationalism, the call to return to the way of the Pious Fathers filled two purposes. 59 Sulaiman ibn Sahrnan embraced the Wahhabi label in a 1916 essay, al-Sawa 'iq al-mursala alshihabiyya 'ala al-shubuh a/-dahida al-shamiyya (Bombay: al-Matbaa al-Mustawfiyya, 1916). Jn the essay, he gave the title as al-Sawa 'iq al-mursala al-wahhabiyya and twice used the term "Wahhabi" as a positive referent defined as those who follow the Qur'an, the Surma, the Pious Fathers, and the founders of the law schools. lbn Sahrnan, 81, 196-7.
It anchored a narrative of the community's rebirth through rediscovering the values and virtues of the Pious Fathers, and it affirmed the community's special place in the world, in this instance, as bearer of a universal divine mission. The latest twist in the meaning of Salafi, its association with armed struggle (jihad) against the Muslim world's enemies, resulting in the "Salafi-Iihadi" neologism, also reflects the impact of political context on religious discourse. Wahhabism's rebranding as Salafi accompanied Saudi Arabia's integration with the Muslim world. From its rise until the late Ottoman era, Wahhabism was a purely regional phenomenon, quarantined from the outside by the stigma of sedition and heresy, and from the inside by a strict view of other Muslims as idolaters. The fall of the Ottoman Empire removed the political structure sustaining the quarantine on Wahhabism. Ibn Saud's pragmatic outlook opened Saudi Arabia to other Muslims, taking clown the internal quarantine and turning a new page in interactions between his domain and the Muslim world. Furthermore, during the interwar period, Saudi Arabia's independence was a rare quality that made it appealing to nationalists in the Arab world.
The charge that Wahhabisrn's claim to be Salafi is illegitimate is part of a struggle over who speaks for Islam. The urgency of the controversy owes something to the reversal in power relations between Saudi Arabia's Wahhabis and their Muslim critics. If we think of Muslim religious discourse operating in a political space, we could say that from the rnid-rrcos until the rnid-iocos, Saudi Arabia was in a weak position, possessing sufficient resources to defend its native religious discourse but definitely in a defensive posture, deflecting a steady stream of polemical aggression from surrounding Muslim lands. Saudi Arabia's accumulation of wealth in the second half of the twentieth century altered the balance of power, making it possible to project its native religious discourse to other Muslim countries through proselytizing and hosting students from other countries at its universities.6o The critics are correct that Saudi religious scholars have constructed an intellectual pedigree that runs from the early Islamic period to Muhammad ibn 'Abel al-Wahhab to themselves, excluding modernists like 'Abel uh and Rida. But such rhetorical sleight of hand is not exceptional; it runs through the entire story of Wahhabism's Salafi turn.
